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of a

with

sixteen, William

Cook Ill, exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial. The jury found Mr. Cook guilty
as charged.
On appeal, Mr. Cook contends that the district court violated his right to a fair trial
and due process when it allowed a statutorily unqualified juror to sit in judgment of
Mr. Cook, and when it refused to allow relevant testimony and evidence as to the results
of a DNA test performed on an item of clothing purportedly worn by the alleged victim.
A reply brief is necessary in this case to correct erroneous assertions made in
the Respondent's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Cook's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
the district court violate Mr.
due process and
a statutorily unqualified person to sit as a
2.

by

Did the district court err in excluding all evidence and testimony as to the results
of the DNA testing performed on the pajama bottoms?

2

ARGUMENT

i.
The Service Of A Statutorily Unqualified Juror Violated Mr. Cook's Rights To Due
Process And To A Fair Trial
Mr. Cook asserts that he was denied his rights to a fair trial and due process of
law when the district court allowed an unqualified juror to sit on his jury and render a
verdict in his case. 1 During voir dire, Juror Hall informed the district court that she no
longer lived in Teton County and had no plans to return to live in Teton County. As
such, she was no longer a resident of Teton County and she was not qualified to serve
on a Teton County jury. Although the district court asked her a few additional questions,
it allowed her to sit on Mr. Cook's jury and decide his case.
The State argues that Juror Hall was qualified to serve on the jury.
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, Juror Hall told the district court she no longer lived
in Teton County, had no intention to move back to Teton County, and had permanently
moved to Rigby.

(2/26/14 Tr., p.72. L.18 - p.73, L21.)

After the district court

erroneously concluded that she was still a resident of Teton County-apparently
because she hadn't changed her vehicle registration or her driver's license-Juror Hall
agreed with the court's mistaken assessment. (2/26/14 Tr., p.74, Ls.8-24.)
The district court was incorrect. Juror Hall did not say she was temporarily living
in Jefferson County-she said she had moved to Rigby (in Jefferson County) and had

Mr. Cook recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently decided, in State v.
Wilson, 2015 Opinion No. 69 (Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2015), that the inclusion of a statutorily
and constitutionally disqualified juror did not constitute fundamental error under the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury; however, Mr. Cook asserts the
empanelment of Juror Hall violated his of due process and fair trial rights. Further, this
Opinion is not yet final as Mr. Wilson filed a Petition for Review on November 19, 2015.
1

3

no

to move back to Teton County. (2/26/14

, p.72, L.18-

her

she had

1.) She told
reflect her new

too early, it expires this year."

but "they wouldn't let [her]

(2/26/14

Tr., p.73, Ls.6-11.) Clearly Juror Hall intended to actually reside in Jefferson County.
The State objects to Mr. Cook's assertion that the Court should define "resident"
as someone who actually lives in the county, and instead the State suggests that
residency may be determined by the payment of utilities, property taxes as well as
vehicle registrations and driver's licenses.

(Respondent's Brief, p.T)

As Mr. Cook

provided in his Appellant's Brief, however, the word "resident" should be given its plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning, that is, someone who lives in a particular place,
concomitantly, a "residence" is the place where a person actually lives, their present
place of abode. See Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149 Idaho 107 (2009) (holding
that, despite owning a home and being registered to vote there, judge did not "actually
reside" in Idaho County as was required), Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014);
LC. § 18-8303(15). As such, the term "resident" should be analyzed in the context of
LC. § 2-209 as meaning a person who actually lives in the county.
Further, there is no evidence that Juror Hall was "temporarily transient," as the
State claims.

(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) The State does not explain why it believes

Juror Hall is "temporarily transient." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) Presumably the State
assumes that Juror Hall was "temporarily transient" because she lived with a roommate
and did not own her own home; however, such a conclusion is absurd. She had a place
to live, she was not homeless.

She had been living with a roommate in Jefferson

County for several months-this does not make her transient. (2/26/14 Tr., p.72, Ls.18-
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not own their own home or have their

Simply because one

name on a

Ultimately, Juror Hall was a

equivocate

of Jefferson County and thus statutorily unqualified to serve as a

in Teton

County.
Mr. Cook was deprived of both his right to a fair trial and due process of law
when he was convicted by a jury that failed to meet statutory and constitutional
requirements.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Excluded Relevant Testimony
And Evidence That The Pajama Bottoms Were Tested And The Defendant's DNA Was
Not Found On Them
The district court erred when it denied the defense the ability to present evidence
that the pajama pants were tested and the results did not indicate the presence of
Mr. Cook's DNA The fact that Mr. Cook's DNA was not present on the pajamas was
both exculpatory and relevant as it made the likelihood that E.K. was telling the truth
less probable.
In response to Mr. Cook's argument, the State claims that this argument is not
preserved for appeal.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-15.)

Although ordinarily issues

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, issues that have been argued to or decided
by the trial court are preserved for appeal

State v. Ouvalt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (1998);

see also State v. Lewis, 126 Idaho 77, 80 (1994) ("contemporaneous objections are
required primarily to afford the trial court an opportunity to prevent or cure error as it is
occurring, not merely to preserve argument for appeal."). On appeal, Mr. Cook asserted
that "the district court abused its discretion when it denied the defense the opportunity to

5

DNA test on

any testimony regarding the test results of
allegedly
was

onto.

16.) In this case, the error

Brief,

the district court had an opportunity

pajamas

prevent or cure the error as it

was occurring, and the issue was thus preserved for appeal.
First, defense counsel argued, at the hearing on the State's motion in limine, that
the pajama testing evidence was highly relevant and exculpatory. (2/26/14 Tr., p.182,
Ls.3-9, p.183, Ls.2-7.) On the eve of trial, the State had filed a motion in limine seeking
to exclude several documents from being admitted as exhibits at trial:

(1) Forensic

Biology Report, dated August 16, 2013; (2) Idaho State Police Forensic Services,
Evidence Submission/Receipt Form, dated June 14, 2013; and (3) Idaho State Police
Forensic DNA Report, dated January 30, 2014. 2 (R., pp.46-55.) The State objected to
the admission/introduction of these three documents as trial exhibits based primarily on
the defense's apparent inability to establish a foundation for admittance and on the
basis that the reports were not relevant. (R., pp.46-55; 2/26/14 Tr., p.153, L.16-p.157,
L.1.)
At the hearing on the State's motion in limine, defense counsel said that he had
anticipated asking the investigating officer, Officer Hale, if he was there when the
pajamas were collected, if he took samples, and whether he had knowledge as to the
results of the tests. (2/26/14 Tr., p.168, Ls.10-21.) Further, defense counsel intended
to elicit from Officer Hale the fact that he frequently relies on such reports in the course
of his duties, and what the report said-it was written in layman's terms and an officer
would rely on such a report in investigating and pursuing charges. (2/26/14 Tr., p.169,
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1, p.1

Ls.22-15, p.171, Ls.11-17.

Defense counsel asserted that there would

technical
admissibility.

(2/26/14

would go
170,

14-17.)

the weight of

Although initially the

court

agreed that the officers could certainly testify as to what the report said and what they
received from the state lab after they sent the pajamas away to be tested, it noted that
such testimony would be insufficient to lay a foundation for the admission of the actual
reports into evidence. 3 (2/26/14 Tr., p.185, Ls.13-16, p.186, Ls.2-3.)
During trial, the issue was addressed again and the district court expanded the
scope of its previous ruling. After Sergeant Hale testified that he took DNA samples
from individuals in Mr. Cook's family, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Hale what other
steps he took in the investigation:
SERGEANT HALE: I personally took DNA samples from a couple
individuals in Mr. Cook's family, meaning swabs. I also arrested Mr. Cook,
and it would have been September 14th.
PROSECUTOR: And beyond that, Deputy Hale, you mentioned some
swabs. Do you ever receive any relevant evidence that's going to be -(2/26/14 Tr., p.240, Ls.11-20.)

After defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's

question, the district court sustained the objection, and excused the jury.
Tr., p.240, L.21 - p.241, L.15.)

(2/26/14

The district court considered the impropriety of the

question in light of its previous ruling on the State's motion in limine, considered

Although the reports were discussed at length at the hearing on the State's motion in
limine, the reports themselves were never introduced or admitted during the hearing.
3 However, the district court later clarified its ruling that any testimony as to the results of
the test, other than the detective's bluff when interviewing Mr. Cook, was prohibited,
"Right, because he would be testifying about the results of the test that I've just told the
defense that they can't testify about the results of." (2/26/14 Tr., p.243, Ls.3-6, p.245,
L24 - p.246, L.3.) Further, the district court told the jury that any reference to genetic
tests was inadmissible. (2/26/14 Tr., p.250, L19 - p.251, L.1.)
2
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a mistrial should be called, cautioned the prosecutor that if this
it

ruling and allow
and ultimately gave a curative instruction.

of thi

to
(2/26/14 Tr., p.241,

L 16 - p.251, L.13.) The court's curative instruction included the following: "there's
certain evidence that I ruled as not admissible. Any reference to any genetic tests in
this case are not for your consideration and you're to disregard anything that may have
been suggested by the question of the prosecutor about testing." (2/26/14 Tr., p.250,
L.8 - p.251, L.13.)
Although the district court gave a curative instruction to which the defense did not
object, 4 this does not change the fact that the defense had initially objected to the
prosecutor's question regarding test results and had argued against the State's motion
in limine to exclude the test results, a ruling which the district court later expanded to
exclude any testimony referencing genetic tests.
addressed the issue now presented on appeal:

Thus, the district court directly
whether the district court erred in

refusing to allow testimony or evidence of any genetic (DNA) testing. Further, while the
district court had previously ruled on the admissibility of the test results, during trial and
following the defense's objection, the court recognized that it was making "a significant
ruling in [the prosecutor's] favor on this matter." (2/26/14 Tr., p.249, Ls.17-18.)
Ultimately, the district court did not just exclude the three documents, it also

excluded any witness from making any reference to the DNA testing. The absence of
Mr. Cook's DNA is just as relevant as the presence of his DNA would have been.

Defense counsel did express disbelief that the jury would be able to follow a curative
instruction where the information was "now in the ears and minds of the jury." (2/26/14
Tr., p.243, L.15 - p.244, L.7.)
4
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State was allowed to

the

testimony
was

were results (other than

bluff that

pajamas were tested and

the defendant's DNA was present), was clearly argued to the district court, decided by
the district court below, and should be considered on appeal. Because the issue was
directly addressed by the trial court below, this Court should decide this issue on
appeal

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Cook respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015.
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